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Many countries, including Australia, regulate the price consumers pay for phar-
maceuticals. In this paper, the Australian Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Scheme (PBS)
is modelled as a multi-stage game played between the regulator and pharmaceutical
ﬁrms. Conditions are derived under which vertically diﬀerentiated ﬁrms are regu-
lated and a number of issues are discussed. These include eﬃciency, regulated ﬁrm
proﬁtability, leakage, and price discrimination. An extension examines the intro-
duction of new drugs and concludes that if all the beneﬁts of a new drug are to
be realised, then existing agreements and transfers (per-unit subsidies) need to be
renegotiated.
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THE DRUG BARGAINING GAME: PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION IN AUSTRALIA
1. Introduction
To ensure consumers equity of access, many countries regulate the price consumers
pay for pharmaceuticals. The regulated price is normally well below the market
price. Therefore, to induce participation by pharmaceutical ﬁrms in the regulatory
regime, transfers are given by the government to the ﬁrms. These transfers are often
implemented through a negotiated agreed price for producers. Willison et al (2001)
document that Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom set a ﬁxed consumer price with the diﬀerence between this price and the
agreed price being the implied per-unit subsidy. In France and Sweden consumers
pay a ﬁxed proportion of the agreed price.
The literature on pharmaceutical regulation is mainly empirical with empha-
sis placed on measuring international price diﬀerences and seeing if they can be
explained by the regulatory environment. Danzon and Chao (2000a) ﬁnd that coun-
tries with strict price regulation (France, Italy, and Japan) have lower prices than
the less regulated markets of the United States and the United Kingdom. However,
Berndt (2000), provides a number of caveats about their interpretation of the data.
In a related paper, Danzon and Chao (2000b), examine whether the extent of price
competition between producers of generic drugs is aﬀected by the regulatory envi-
ronment in which they operate. They ﬁnd that price competition is signiﬁcant in
less regulated markets (United States, Canada), but not in more regulated markets
(France, Italy, and Japan).
Despite a substantial empirical literature, the theoretical literature on pharma-
ceutical regulation is rather scant. This paper endeavors to correct this situation
by building a theoretical model of the Australian Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Scheme
(PBS). The goal is to discover the implications of its design and suggest possible
improvements. Although it is based on the Australian system, the model has wider
appeal because similar schemes are in place in many European countries as well as
Canada and New Zealand.
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The PBS is modelled as a ﬁve stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, pharmaceutical
ﬁrms choose whether to enter the regulation process. In the second, the quality
of the drug is determined and in the third, given the regulated price, the regulator
chooses which ﬁrm/s to regulate. In the fourth stage, the regulator and the regulated
ﬁrm bargain over a transfer which can be implemented via an agreed producer price
and ﬁnally, in the ﬁfth stage, pharmaceutical ﬁrms, with diﬀerent quality drugs,
compete with each other in the drug market.1
The main results are summarised in Propositions 1 and 2. Together they state
that as long as the regulated price is less than the unregulated price of the high
quality ﬁrm, then the high quality ﬁrm always enters the regulation process and is
regulated. The negotiated agreed price is less than the unregulated price of the high
quality ﬁrm. In some circumstances the low quality ﬁrm also enters the regulation
process and is regulated. Since the regulated price is the same for high and low
quality ﬁrms, a regulated low quality ﬁrm makes no sales. Essentially, the low
quality ﬁrm is regulated to stop the low quality ﬁrm stealing consumers away from
the high quality ﬁrm.
Once the model is outlined, a number of implications are drawn. The ﬁrst is that
a lowering of the regulated price for some drug classes can increase the regulator’s
payoﬀ and reinforce equity of access. Therefore, the policy of having a single identical
regulated price for all drug classes needs to be re-examined. Second, although the
agreed price is below the unregulated price of the high quality ﬁrm, this does not
mean the regulated high quality ﬁrm is worse oﬀ under regulation than without
regulation. In fact, the bargaining process ensures it can not be made worse oﬀ.
Third, the theory suggests that in the bargaining process the high quality uses of
the drug should be speciﬁed and its subsidised use restricted to these uses. Failure
to do so results in the subsidised use of the drug leaking out into low quality uses.
Although this increases consumer surplus, it can reduce the regulator’s payoﬀ if the
1Anis and Wen (1998) develop a theoretical model of pharmaceutical regulation in Canada, but
ignore strategic interactions between ﬁrms by assuming monopoly and ignore interactions between
pharmaceutical ﬁrms and the regulator by modelling regulation as a price constraint.
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induced unnegotiated transfers are large enough. In the absence of enforced use
restrictions, solutions to the problem of unnegotiated transfers include the use of
lump-sum transfers or price-volume contracts.
A feature of the Australian PBS is that there are two regulated prices. Con-
cessional patients face a lower regulated price than general patients. Amending the
analysis to incorporate a high and a low regulated price reveals that having two reg-
ulated prices can increase the regulator’s payoﬀ if in the presence of one regulated
price (i) some consumers purchased the low quality drug or (ii) both high and low
quality ﬁrms are regulated. If a single regulated price was chosen eﬃciently by the
government, neither of these two cases would arise. Therefore, it is the arbitrariness
of the setting of the regulated price that introduces situations in which having two
regulated prices leads to greater regulator payoﬀs.
Finally, the model is amended to take exogenous innovation into account. First,
a new lowest quality drug is introduced. It is shown that this can increase the
payoﬀ of the regulator even if the ﬁrm producing the new drug makes no sales. This
follows because the presence of the new drug alters the disagreement payoﬀs in the
absence of regulation in such a way that a smaller transfer is paid to the high quality
regulated ﬁrm. It is also shown that no regulation might maximise the regulators
payoﬀ. In either of these cases, for all the beneﬁts of the new drug to be realised, it
is necessary for existing regulatory agreements to be renegotiated. This may entail
drugs that were initially regulated being removed from regulation. Next, a new
highest quality drug is introduced. The message is similar, to realise all the beneﬁts
from a new drug requires existing regulatory agreements to be renegotiated.
2. Australian Pharmaceutical Regulation -
Institutional Detail and Procedures
Pharmaceutical patents provide their holders with monopoly power which allows
them to charge monopoly prices. These prices can be such that an individual whose
health outcome would be improved by taking the drug cannot aﬀord to do so. To
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ensure equity of access to drugs, the Australian government has implemented a sys-
tem of regulated prices and subsidies known as the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Scheme
(PBS).2 The price a consumer pays for a drug appearing on the PBS list is either
A$22.40 for a general patient or A$3.60 for a concessional patient (aged, disabled,
unemployed etc.).
To ensure pharmaceutical ﬁrms participate in the scheme, the Pharmaceutical
Beneﬁts Pricing Authority (PBPA) determines a list of agreed prices which phar-
macists (dispensers) pay the pharmaceutical ﬁrms for their drugs. If this price is
above the price paid by consumers, then pharmacists claim the diﬀerence from the
government, essentially, consumption of the drug is subsidized.
To be listed, a drug must meet eﬃcacy, safety, and quality standards. In addi-
tion, it must undergo an economic evaluation. First, its quality relative to a com-
parator (the best existing treatment) is determined. Next, an agreed price, which
ensures cost-eﬀectiveness, is negotiated. To be cost-eﬀective, an additional unit of
health outcome must be attained at less cost with the drug being evaluated than the
comparator. Generally, drugs that are cost-eﬀective are listed at the agreed price.
In determining the agreed price, the PBPA takes into account a number of factor.
These include comments on the clinical and cost eﬀectiveness aspects of the drug,
prices of alternative brands, prices of drugs in the same therapeutic group, cost in-
formation, prescription volumes, and the prices of the drug in comparable overseas
countries.
Two important characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry in Australia are
(i) pharmaceutical ﬁrms are foreign owned and (ii) the pharmaceutical market is
small relative to the world market. The ﬁrst characteristic implies that the proﬁts
of pharmaceutical ﬁrms are not a component of Australian welfare and the second
characteristic implies that the impact of Australian pharmaceutical regulation on
pharmaceutical ﬁrm R&D is so small that it can be ignored.
2In PBPA (2000) the objective of the PBS scheme is given as “.... to secure a reliable supply of
pharmaceutical products at the most reasonable cost to Australian taxpayers and consumers....”
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3. Game Structure
Pharmaceutical regulation in Australia can be modelled as a stage game. In the
ﬁrst stage, a foreign owned pharmaceutical ﬁrm, at some cost, chooses whether
or not to go through the drug evaluation, bargaining, and regulation process for
a particular drug. If the ﬁrm decides to enter this process, then in the second
stage the regulator evaluates the quality of the drug submitted for evaluation. In
the third stage, the regulator decides which ﬁrms to regulate. The fourth stage
involves bargaining (negotiation) between the regulator and the regulated ﬁrms over
the transfer (subsidy) the ﬁrms are to receive in return for selling their drug at
the regulated price to consumers. In the ﬁfth stage, ﬁrms compete in the drug
market. Those ﬁrms that have successfully gone through the evaluation process are
constrained to charge the regulated price, other ﬁrms that have been unsuccessful
in the evaluation process or did not enter it in the ﬁrst place are free to charge any
price they wish. The regulated price is not determined by the regulator, but is given
to it by the government. As is usual, the game is solved backwards for the sub-game
perfect Nash Equilibrium.
3.1. Stage Five - Drug Market Competition
The model used for drug market competition is a direct extension of the vertical
diﬀerentiation model outlined in Tirole (1988, chpt 7). Mussa and Rosen (1978)
preferences are assumed, so an individual with preference parameter θ obtains sur-
plus
V = θs − p (1)
when purchasing one unit of a drug of quality s at a price of p, and zero otherwise.
The individual preference parameter, θ, is assumed to be uniformly distributed with
density one across the population of consumers on the interval [θ, ¯ θ], where ¯ θ = θ+1.
It is assumed that there are two ﬁrms, 1 and 2, selling drugs within the same
therapeutic class with qualities s1 < s2, respectively. These ﬁrms have identical
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and constant marginal production costs equal to c and choose prices, p1 and p2, to
maximise proﬁt. There are four cases to consider.
3.1.1. Neither Firm Regulated
The case of most interest is where both ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to produce, so it is
assumed that ¯ θ > 2θ. In addition, it is assumed that the market is covered, that
is, all consumers buy one unit of one of the drugs. This requires that p1 ≤ θs1 in
equilibrium.
Let ˜ θ =
p2−p1
s2−s1, it is straight-forward to show that individuals with preference
parameter θ ≥ ˜ θ purchase from the high quality ﬁrm, ﬁrm 2, while the remaining








The demand for the high quality drug falls with an increase in its price, because
some consumers switch to the low quality drug. Substitution of this type is consistent
with the ﬁndings of Pavcnik (2002). She found retail price falls of between 10-26%
accompanied Germany’s 1989 switch from a ﬂat prescription fee to reference pricing.3
Presumably, to reduce consumer substitution into competing drugs under reference
pricing, pharmaceutical ﬁrms lowered retail prices so that the out-of-pocket expense
to consumers increased by less than otherwise.
Firm proﬁts are
Π1 = (p1 − c)D1(p1,p2); Π2 = (p2 − c)D2(p1,p2) (3)
and the best response functions of each ﬁrm are
p1 =
p2 + c − (s2 − s1)θ
2
; p2 =
p1 + c + (s2 − s1)¯ θ
2
. (4)
Note that prices are strategic complements.
Solving (4) simultaneously for the Nash equilibrium prices yields
pn
1 = c +
¯ θ − 2θ
3
(s2 − s1) > c (5)
3If the retail price exceeds the reference price, then the consumer pays the diﬀerence.
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and
pn
2 = c +
2¯ θ − θ
3
(s2 − s1) > pn
1. (6)
These price equations are consistent with Lu and Comanor (1998) who found, for the
United States, that the greater was the therapeutic diﬀerence (quality diﬀerence)
between two drugs, the greater was the price diﬀerential. Denote Nash equilibrium
proﬁts by Πn
2 > Πn












where ˜ θ =
θ+¯ θ
3 . Equilibrium prices, consumer surpluses, and proﬁts are shown in
Figure 1.
3.1.2. High Quality Firm Regulated - Low Quality Firm Unregulated
The eﬀect of a regulated consumer price of p2 = ¯ p2, depends on the size of ¯ p2. A
number of cases are considered.
Case 1: c < pn
1 < pn
2 < ¯ p2
In this case, the regulated price is greater than the unregulated price of the
high quality ﬁrm. Since (4) reveals that prices are strategic complements, the best
response of ﬁrm 1 to regulation of ﬁrm 2 is to charge a price, ˆ p1 > pn
1, where a
hat signiﬁes the value of a variable when the high quality ﬁrm is regulated. In the
Appendix, it is shown that ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 is a decreasing function of ¯ p2, therefore
ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 < Sn
1 + Sn
2. (8)
It is not surprising that the sum of consumer surpluses decreases with an increase
in the price of both drugs. Finally, note that
ˆ Π1 > Πn
1; ˆ Π2 > Πn
2. (9)
because ¯ p2 > pn
2, ˆ p1 > pn
1, and the best response functions are positively sloped.
Case 2a: c < pn
1 < α < ¯ p2 ≤ pn
2
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In this case, the regulated price is below the high quality ﬁrm’s unregulated
price, but above the low quality ﬁrm’s unregulated price. The variable α is deﬁned
by α ≡ c + (s2 − s1)θ. Calculation reveals that pn
1 < α if 5θ > ¯ θ. This condition is
assumed throughout the paper. Examining (4) reveals that if ¯ p2 > α, then the best
response of ﬁrm 1, ˆ p1, is such that c < ˆ p1 ≤ pn
1. At this price, ﬁrm 1 has positive sales.
Using the fact that ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 is a decreasing function of ¯ p2 the following inequality
holds
ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 ≥ Sn
1 + Sn
2. (10)
It is not surprising that the sum of consumers surpluses increases with a decrease in
both prices. Finally, note that
0 < ˆ Π1 < Πn
1; 0 < ˆ Π2 < Πn
2. (11)
because ¯ p2 < pn
2, ˆ p1 < pn
1, and the best response functions are positively sloped.
Case 2b: c < pn
1 < ¯ p2 ≤ α < pn
2
Examining (4) reveals that if ¯ p2 ≤ α, then the best response of ﬁrm 1 is ˆ p1 = c <
pn
1. At this price, ﬁrm 1 has zero sales. The condition ¯ p2 ≤ α, can be rewritten as
θs2− ¯ p2 ≥ θs1−c which implies there is no price at which ﬁrm 1’s sales are positive.
Inequality (10) still holds, but with ˆ S1 = 0. Proﬁts are
0 = ˆ Π1 < Πn
1; 0 < ˆ Π2 < Πn
2. (12)
Case 3: c < ¯ p2 ≤ pn
1 < α < pn
2
In this case, the regulated price is below the unregulated prices of both the high
and low quality ﬁrms. As in case 2b, the best response of ﬁrm 1 is ˆ p1 = c. At
this price ﬁrm 1 has zero sales. The relationships between consumer surpluses and
proﬁts are identical to case 2b above.
3.1.3. Low Quality Firm Regulated - High Quality Firm Unregulated
As in the preceding sub-section, the eﬀect of a regulated consumer price of p1 = ¯ p1
diﬀers depending on the size of ¯ p1.
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Case 4: c < pn
1 < ¯ p1
In this case, the regulated price is greater than the unregulated price of the low
quality ﬁrm. Since prices are strategic complements, the best response of ﬁrm 2 to
regulation of ﬁrm 1 is to charge a price, ˇ p2 > pn
2, where a check signiﬁes the value
of a variable when the low quality ﬁrm is regulated. In the Appendix, it is shown
that ˇ S1 + ˇ S2 is a decreasing function of ¯ p1, therefore,
ˇ S1 + ˇ S2 < Sn
1 + Sn
2. (13)
Regulation has moved prices closer to the collusive outcome so
ˇ Π1 > Πn
1; ˇ Π2 > Πn
2 (14)
Case 5: c < ¯ p1 ≤ pn
1
In this case, the regulated price is less than the unregulated price of the low
quality ﬁrm. The best response of ﬁrm 2 is ˇ p2 < pn
2. It follows that




ˇ Π1 ≤ Πn
1; ˇ Π2 < Πn
2 (16)
3.1.4. Both Firms Regulated
The eﬀect of a regulated consumer price of p1 = p2 = ¯ p1 = ¯ p2 is for all consumers to
buy the high quality drug if they buy at all. For the case where ¯ p1 = ¯ p2 > θs2 > c,
the market is not covered. For c ≤ ¯ p1 = ¯ p2 < θs2 the market is covered. Denote
proﬁts of the two ﬁrms and surpluses of the consumers where both ﬁrms are regulated
by ¯ Π1 = 0, ¯ Π2, ¯ S1 = 0, and ¯ S2.
3.2. Stage Four - Bargaining Over the Transfer
In this stage, the regulator and the regulated ﬁrms bargain over the transfer, L, that
is paid to the ﬁrm in return for it being constrained to charge the regulated price
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to consumers. A cooperative approach to the bargaining problem is assumed and a
Nash bargaining solution is sought.
For expository reasons the case where only the high quality ﬁrm is regulated is
developed. Given transfer L, the regulator achieves payoﬀ ˆ S1+ ˆ S2−L. The payoﬀ of
the regulator does not include the proﬁts of ﬁrms 1 and 2, because they are foreign
ﬁrms. The payoﬀ of the high quality ﬁrm is its regulated proﬁt plus the transfer
it receives, that is, ˆ Π2 + L. If no agreement between the regulator and the ﬁrm is


















L ≥ 0 (18)
Constraint (18) is included as there is no mechanism in practice for ﬁrms to make
transfers to the regulator. Rearranging the ﬁrst order condition of this maximisation
problem yields the interior solution
ˆ L∗ =
(ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 − Sn
1 − Sn




Note that ˆ L∗ is a function of (c,s1,s2, ˆ p1, ¯ p2,pn
1,pn
2). The size of the transfer depends
on marginal cost, the qualities of the two drugs, the regulated price and ﬁrm 1’s best
response, and the unregulated prices. These are variables listed as factors in PBPA
(2000), which are considered by the PBPA when deciding the size of the transfer it
gives to ﬁrms with drugs listed on the PBS schedule. Constraint (18) is satisﬁed if
(ˆ S1 + ˆ S2) − (Sn
1 + Sn
2) ≥ (ˆ Π2 − Πn
2). (20)
Assuming (20) holds, the regulator obtains a payoﬀ of
ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 − ˆ L∗ =













and the ﬁrm obtains a payoﬀ of
ˆ Π2 + ˆ L∗ =
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The diﬀerence (ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 + ˆ Π2) − (Sn
1 + Sn
2 + Πn
2) is shown in Figure 2.
The regulator’s payoﬀ is what it gets if there is no agreement plus half the
additional total surplus generated by the agreement. Similarly the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is
what it gets if there is no agreement plus half the additional total surplus generated
by the agreement.
In practice, the regulator and the ﬁrm do not explicitly bargain over a transfer
L, but rather bargain over the size of a per-unit subsidy, ν. However, a bargain over





where ˆ q2 is the quantity the regulated ﬁrm sells at the regulated price, ¯ p2. The price
the regulated ﬁrm receives for each unit sold is pa
2 = ¯ p2+ˆ ν∗ and in practice is known
as the agreed price.
The case where only the low quality ﬁrm is regulated is identical to the above
except ˆ Π1 and Πn
1 replace ˆ Π2 and Πn
2 in (17). The case where both ﬁrms are
regulated is similar in structure to that above except now the regulator and the two
ﬁrms bargain over transfers L1 and L2. This problem is just an extension of Nash’s
bilateral bargaining problem to multilateral bargaining and is given formally in the
Appendix.4
3.3. Stage Three - Regulator Choice of Firm to Regulate
Given the regulated price, the regulator acts to maximise surplus net of the transfer
and so chooses the regulation regime that gives it the greatest S1 +S2 −L∗. As the
payoﬀs from regulation vary according to the value of ¯ p1 and/or ¯ p2, so will the choice
of which ﬁrm to regulate. Therefore, the cases considered in the previous sections
will each be analysed in turn.
Case 4: c < pn
1 < ¯ p1
4An alternating oﬀer game that implements the multilateral extension of the Nash bargaining
solution can be found in Krishna and Serrano (1996).
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By result (13),
ˇ S1 + ˇ S2 − L∗ < Sn
1 + Sn
2 (24)
for all L∗ > 0. Therefore, in this case, regulating neither ﬁrm dominates regulating
the low quality ﬁrm.
Case 1: c < pn
1 < pn
2 < ¯ p2
By result (8),
ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 − L∗ < Sn
1 + Sn
2 (25)
for all L∗ > 0. In addition, where both ﬁrms are regulated, ¯ p1 = ¯ p2 ≥ pn
2, it is shown
in the Appendix that
¯ S1 + ¯ S2 − L∗ < Sn
1 + Sn
2 (26)
for all L∗ ≥ 0. Therefore, in this case, regulating neither ﬁrm dominates regulating
only the high quality ﬁrm or regulating both ﬁrms. Combining the results of Cases 4
and 1, yields the result that neither ﬁrm is regulated if the regulation price is greater
than the unregulated price of the high quality ﬁrm. This has intuitive appeal. The
inequalities in (24), (25), and (26) are conﬁrmed in the ﬁrst two rows of Table 1.
Case 2a: c < pn
1 < α < ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 ≤ pn
2
Case 4 above applies, so the low quality ﬁrm is never regulated on its own. In
the Appendix, it is shown that ˆ S1+ ˆ S2+ ˆ Π2 is a decreasing function of ¯ p2. Therefore,
using (21)
ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 − ˆ L∗ > Sn
1 + Sn
2. (27)
As a result, regulating the high quality ﬁrm dominates regulating neither ﬁrm. How-
ever, it is possible that regulating both ﬁrms dominates regulating just the high
quality ﬁrm.
Table 1 conﬁrms, for a particular parameterisation of the model, that regulating
both ﬁrms dominates regulating just the high quality ﬁrm. This occurs at a regulated
price of ¯ p1 = ¯ p2 = 1. If only the high quality ﬁrm was regulated, then some consumers
would purchase the low quality drug because this price is greater than α = .75.
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Regulating both drugs at a price of 1 ensures the market is covered and that only the
high quality drug is purchased. Although total consumer surplus is lower, ˆ S1+ ˆ S2 >
¯ S2, the proﬁts of the high quality ﬁrm have increased to such an extent that it is
given no transfer and the transfer to the low quality ﬁrm is lower than what would
be given to the high quality ﬁrm if it was the sole ﬁrm regulated. It is this reduction
in the transfer that makes regulating both ﬁrms dominate regulating just the high
quality ﬁrm. Essentially, the low quality ﬁrm is given a transfer so it does not steal
consumers away from the high quality ﬁrm.
At a price of ¯ p1 = ¯ p2 = .85, Table 1 reveals that regulating just the high quality
ﬁrm dominates regulating both ﬁrms. Unfortunately, whether regulating both ﬁrms
dominates regulating just the high quality ﬁrm is not monotonic in the regulated
price and so the analysis of this case, in general, is tedious and not done.5 The
important point to take from Table 1 is that in the case under consideration it is
possible that regulating both ﬁrms dominates regulating just the high quality ﬁrm.
It should be noted, that where both ﬁrms are regulated, the low quality ﬁrm
makes no sales. Therefore, any transfer it receives cannot be given as a per-unit
subsidy, it must be given as a lump-sum. On the other hand, the transfer given to
the high quality ﬁrm can be given as a per-unit subsidy and is determined as in (23)
above.
Case 2b: c < pn
1 < ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 ≤ α < pn
2
Once again, Case 4 above applies and the low quality ﬁrm is never regulated on
its own. As in Case 2a, regulating just the high quality ﬁrm dominates regulating
neither. However, unlike Case 2a, regulating both ﬁrms never dominates regulating
just the high quality ﬁrm. This follows because consumer surplus and the proﬁts of
each ﬁrm are identical regardless of whether just the high quality ﬁrm is regulated
or both ﬁrms are regulated. In particular,
¯ Π1 = ˆ Π1 = 0; ¯ Π2 = ˆ Π2; ¯ S1 = ˆ S1 = 0; ¯ S2 = ˆ S2. (28)
5The lack of monotonicity can be deduced from Table 1, where at a regulated price less than,
but very close to p
n
2, regulating just the high quality ﬁrm dominates regulating both ﬁrms
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However, having to ensure the low quality ﬁrm a payoﬀ of at least Πn
1, where both
ﬁrms are regulated, increases the size of the transfer relative to where only the
high quality ﬁrm is regulated. This bigger transfer ensures that regulating just the
high quality ﬁrm dominates regulating both ﬁrms. This is conﬁrmed in Table 1 at
¯ p2 = ¯ p1 = α = .75 and at a regulated price of .6.
Case 3: c < ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 ≤ pn
1 < α < pn
2
Case 2b above applies, so regulating the high quality ﬁrm dominates regulating
neither ﬁrm and regulating both ﬁrms. In the Appendix, it is shown that ˇ S1+ ˇ S2+ˇ Π1
is a decreasing function of ¯ p1. Therefore, using the equivalent condition to (21) for
regulating the low quality ﬁrm yields
ˇ S1 + ˇ S2 − ˇ L∗ > Sn
1 + Sn
2. (29)
Therefore, unlike Case 2b, in this case, regulating the low quality ﬁrm dominates
regulating neither ﬁrm. This is conﬁrmed in the last row of Table 1. The choice
the regulator faces is between regulating the low quality ﬁrm or regulating the high
quality ﬁrm.
The regulator’s payoﬀs from regulating the low and the high quality ﬁrms are
ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 − ˆ L∗ and ˇ S1 + ˇ S2 − ˇ L∗, respectively. Subtracting these two payoﬀs and
substituting from (21) and its equivalent for regulating the low quality ﬁrm yields
(ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 − ˆ L∗) − (ˇ S1 + ˇ S2 − ˇ L∗) = (30)















The regulator chooses to regulate the high quality ﬁrm if (30) is greater than zero




2) remains constant as the regulated price changes. However, as
shown in the Appendix, (ˇ S1 + ˇ S2 + ˇ Π1) − (Sn
1 + Sn
2 + Πn
1) is a decreasing function
of ¯ p1 and so reaches a maximum at ¯ p1 = c. Therefore, (30) is greater than zero for
all ¯ p1 < pn
1 if it is greater than zero at ¯ p1 = c.
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Tedious calculation reveals that the diﬀerence in (30) can be written as
(s2 − s1)(−3θ2 + 2θ + 1)
48
(31)
which is strictly greater than zero on the interval θ ∈ (0,1). The assumptions that
¯ θ = θ + 1 and ¯ θ > 2θ ensure that θ falls in this interval and so regulating the high
quality ﬁrm dominates regulating the low quality ﬁrm. Once again this is conﬁrmed
in the last row of Table 1. Therefore, in this case, the regulator chooses to regulate
the high quality ﬁrm.
The analysis of this subsection is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: For ¯ p1 = ¯ p2 > pn
2, neither drug is regulated. For c < pn
1 < α <
¯ p1 = ¯ p2 ≤ pn
2, the high quality drug is regulated and for some parameterisations the
low quality drug is also regulated. Finally, for c < ¯ p1 = ¯ p2 ≤ α, the high quality drug
is regulated.
This proposition requires many assumptions and a deal of eﬀort to prove and
yet the intuition is clear. If the regulated price is higher than the unregulated price
of the high quality drug, then regulation pushes prices closer to their joint proﬁt
maximising level and reduces the regulator’s payoﬀ. In this case, no regulation is
optimal. If the regulated price is below the unregulated price of the high quality
drug, then regulating the high quality drug pushes prices away from their joint
proﬁt maximising level and increases the regulators payoﬀ. If the regulated price is
relatively high, then some consumers purchase the low quality drug. In this case,
by regulating both drugs the regulator ensures that only the high quality drug is
purchased. In essence, the low quality ﬁrm is bribed not to steal consumers away
from the high quality ﬁrm.
3.4. Stage Two - Quality Evaluation
Drugs that are submitted for evaluation have their quality determined, either high
or low, at a ﬁxed cost of k. It is assumed that there is no error in this process.
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3.5. Stage One - The Evaluation Decision
In this stage, the ﬁrms decide whether to enter the evaluation and negotiation stage
of the game. The high quality ﬁrm knows that the evaluation process will reveal it
to be high quality and that in Stage 3 the regulator will choose to regulate it as long
as ¯ p2 < pn
2. In the bargaining stage, it is guaranteed a payoﬀ including the transfer
which is strictly greater than its unregulated proﬁt, therefore, for small k, the high
quality ﬁrm chooses to enter the evaluation and negotiation stages of the game. For
pn
2 ≤ ¯ p2 and any positive k, the high quality ﬁrm chooses not to enter the evaluation
stage of the game as it will not be regulated, and entering reduces its payoﬀ by k.
The low quality ﬁrm knows that the evaluation process will reveal it to be low
quality and that in Stage 3 the regulator will choose to regulate it only for some
¯ p1 ∈ (α,pn
2). For these regulated prices, both ﬁrms are regulated and the bargaining
process guarantees the low quality ﬁrm a payoﬀ which is strictly greater than its
unregulated proﬁt. Therefore, for small k, the low quality ﬁrm chooses to enter the
evaluation and negotiation stages of the game. For all other ¯ p1 and any positive k,
the low quality ﬁrm chooses not to enter the evaluation stage of the game as it will
not be regulated and entering reduces its payoﬀ by k.
The equilibrium of the stage game is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the PBS stage game
is for neither ﬁrm to enter the evaluation stage of the game if the regulated price
is greater than or equal to the unregulated price of the high quality ﬁrm. If the
regulated price is below the unregulated price of the high quality ﬁrm and k is small,
then the high quality ﬁrm enters the evaluation process and has its price regulated. It
receives a transfer in the form of a per-unit subsidy. If the regulated price is below the
unregulated price of the high quality ﬁrm, but above α, then, for some regulated prices,
the low quality ﬁrm also enters the evaluation process and has its price regulated.
The low quality ﬁrm sells no output and receives a lump-sum transfer. For all other
regulated prices the low quality ﬁrm does not enter the evaluation stage of the game.
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4. Discussion
4.1. Eﬃcient Price Regulation
Pharmaceutical ﬁrms are foreign owned, so a government solely concerned with
eﬃciency would choose the regulated price to maximise S1 + S2 − L.
Proposition 3: A regulated price is eﬃcient if and only if it is in the interval
c ≤ ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 ≤ α.
Proof: In the Appendix
The intuition is clear. Any regulated price in this interval has an equilibrium in
which only the high quality ﬁrm is regulated and all consumers purchase the high
quality drug. Therefore, any price in this interval maximises the total surplus, net
of disagreement payoﬀs, which is available to be distributed between the regulator
and the high quality ﬁrm.
The interval [c,α = c + (s2 − s1)θ] diﬀers for diﬀerent drugs and so eﬃcient
pricing would in general have diﬀerent classes of drugs being regulated at diﬀerent
prices. However, in Australia, all drugs are regulated at the same price.6 For those
drug classes for which the single regulated price is above the α of that drug class, a
lowering of the regulated price increases the regulator’s payoﬀ and reinforces equity
of access. This suggest further thought needs to be given to the policy of having a
single regulated price for all drug classes.7
Finally, it should be noted that although a lowering of the single regulated price
increases the regulator’s payoﬀ for some drug classes, for those drug classes, where
the regulated price is already below α, a lowering of the regulated price leaves both
the regulator’s and the ﬁrm’s payoﬀs unchanged. This latter case highlights the
distributional changes associated with changes in the regulated price. The lower
6Although the regulated price per prescription is identical for all drugs, the price of a course of
treatment can vary if diﬀerent conditions and treatments require diﬀerent numbers of prescriptions.
Therefore, although the price per prescription is ﬁxed, the PBPA can get eﬀective price diﬀerences
by varying the number of doses in a script. There is no evidence to suggest that the PBPA does
this.
7Perhaps, the information requirements of having diﬀerent regulated prices for diﬀerent drug
classes are too high.
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regulated price increases consumer surplus and increases the size of the transfer
needed to compensate the pharmaceutical ﬁrm for lost proﬁt. Income has been
redistributed from taxpayers, who provide the revenue the government needs to
implement transfers, to the consumers of drugs.
4.2. Firm Proﬁtability
The assumed bargaining process ensures any regulated ﬁrm obtains a greater payoﬀ
under regulation than it would if it was not regulated. For example, where c < ¯ p1 =
¯ p2 ≤ α, only the high quality ﬁrm is regulated. Its payoﬀ is ˆ Π2 + ˆ L∗ > Πn
2 which
is the payoﬀ it obtains in the absence of an agreement, Πn
2, plus half the additional
surplus generated by the agreement. Clearly, in this case, the high quality ﬁrm likes
the PBS system.
This is true for any regulated high quality ﬁrm despite the fact that the agreed
price is less than the unregulated price, that is pa
2 < pn
2.8 This inequality is shown to
hold in the Appendix. A lower price received by the regulated ﬁrm is no indication
that it is worse oﬀ. This follows because consumers only pay ¯ p2 rather than pa
2 for the
high quality drug and so the regulated ﬁrm receives pa
2 on a larger quantity than it
would sell in the absence of regulation. It is this increase in quantity sold that makes
the PBS system attractive to high quality regulated ﬁrms. This increase in quantity
sold also makes it clear that the regulator is not exploiting any monopsony power.
The price the pharmaceutical ﬁrm receives has not fallen below the unregulated
price because of a movement down an upward sloping supply curve, but rather as
the result of a bargaining process.
Regulated low quality ﬁrms have zero sales, but receive a lump-sum transfer to
ensure they are better oﬀ being regulated compared to being unregulated. On the
other hand, the payoﬀ of an unregulated low quality ﬁrm decreases as a result of the
regulation of the high quality ﬁrm, in fact, ˆ Π1 = 0.
8This is a within country price inequality that cannot be veriﬁed empirically because p
n
2 is not
observable. However, Danzon and Chao (2002a) found, across countries, that the agreed price in
regulated markets was less than the market price in unregulated markets.
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In the light of this discussion, what explains the pharmaceutical industry’s hostil-
ity to the PBS system? One can understand why low quality ﬁrms might be hostile,
but not general hostility.9 As the negotiation process ensures that any regulated
ﬁrm gets a payoﬀ at least as large as if no regulation was in place, it would seem
the industry postures hostility to do even better than this. The industry beneﬁts
from regulation, but like all industries would like to obtain an even greater payoﬀ
and so argues that the agreed price is too low. In doing this, it often compares the
agreed price to prices in the US, which are higher.10 However, this is not appro-
priate. Controlling for the size of the two markets, the quantity sold at the agreed
price in Australia under regulation would be far greater than what would be sold
in the US at this same price because consumers only pay ¯ p2 under regulation, not
pa
2 = ¯ p2 + ν∗. Given this argument, it is surprising that in Australia, the PBPA en-
courages pharmaceutical ﬁrms to make such comparisons by stating in PBPA (2000)
that one of the factors it considers when determining the agreed price is “prices of
the drug in reasonably comparable overseas countries.” The analysis of this paper
suggests that all that should be looked at when determining the agreed price is the
additional surplus regulation generates and the quantity sold at the regulated price.
4.3. Leakage
So far it has been assumed that a drug has one use, but in reality drugs can have
more than one use. This does not cause a problem for the analysis above for it can
be repeated for each possible use. Let there be n uses for drug x. Index these uses so
that in uses 1,...,k the drug is high quality and assume the regulated price is such
that the high quality use is always regulated.
For uses i = 1,...,k, let ˆ L∗i be the transfer determined in the bargaining process,
9In fact, a pharmaceutical ﬁrm might be a low quality producer in one class of drug, but a high
quality producer in another class. Overall, a ﬁrm is better oﬀ with regulation than without if the
extra payoﬀ it achieves from being the high quality regulated ﬁrm in one class of drug (class i) is
greater than the payoﬀ it loses by being the low quality unregulated ﬁrm in another class of drug
(class j), that is, if ˆ Π
i






10Presumably, higher prices in the US are indicative of prices and proﬁts being high in the absence
of regulation, that is, indicative of high disagreement payoﬀs.
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let ˆ qi





with agreed price, pai
2 = ¯ p2 +ν∗i. Note, each use has a diﬀerent
agreed price. Now as pai
2 is just a device to make a transfer to the ﬁrm and eﬀects no
production or consumption decisions, the transfer could be implemented by having






with one agreed price, pa
2 = ¯ p2 + ν∗. Of course,
paying this agreed price would be restricted to uses 1,...,k.
In reality, the PBPA can place restrictions on subsidised use, but they are not
as widespread as theory would suggest. As a result, a problem known as leakage
arises.11 Assume there are no restrictions on the subsidised use of drug x, so re-
gardless of use, consumers pay ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 and the producer receives pa
2. Consider a use
j ∈ (k,n] for which there is a competitor of high quality, but this competitor is not
regulated as it has chosen not to enter the costly evaluation process. It is possible
that ¯ p1 < p2(¯ p1) < pn
2 and by enough to ensure that some consumers purchase drug
x in its low quality use. Drug x in its low quality use has been given the 1 subscript
while the high quality competitor has been given the 2 subscript. Regulation and
the failure to enforce restrictions on subsidised use, has resulted in drug x, which
was regulated for high quality uses, leaking out into a low quality use.
Although leakage increases the total transfer paid to the producer of drug x above
that determined in the bargaining process, (where only uses 1,...,k were considered),
it also increases consumer surplus because (i) the price of the high quality drug falls
below what it would be in the absence of leakage and (ii) those consumers who
purchase the drug in its low quality use only do so because they obtain more surplus
through this action. Therefore, leakage does not necessarily reduce the regulator’s
payoﬀ. For a big enough per-unit subsidy, leakage does reduce welfare, but what is
big enough depends on the parameters of the model.
In the absence of enforced use restrictions, one way to avoid the unnegotiated
transfers that result from leakage is to negotiate price-volume contracts. Consider
11This problem is informally discussed in Birkett, Mitchell, and McManus (2001). In Canada,
this problem is known as prescription creep, Laupacis (2002)
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the following price-volume contract
pa









that is, the ﬁrm is paid the agreed price for sales no greater than the aggregate
quantity associated with the regulated price in its restricted uses and the regulated
price for any additional sales. This contract avoids the problem of unnegotiated
transfers and so ensures that leakage increases the payoﬀ of the regulator.
Another method of avoiding unnegotiated transfers is to make a lump-sum trans-
fer
k
1 ˆ L∗i and not calculate an implied subsidy and agreed price.
k
1 ˆ L∗i, is trans-
ferred no matter what the drugs eventual uses. If a drug has many uses, then
those that are regulated are determined in the choice of use to regulate stage of the
game (Stage Three), taken into account in the bargaining process (Stage Four), and
incorporated in the transfer
k
1 ˆ L∗i.
A problem related to leakage is the failure to account for all high quality uses
in the evaluation and negotiation stages of the regulation game. Let use f ∈ [1,k]
be a high quality use that is not included in the bargaining process. Assume that
restrictions on subsidised use are not in place or not enforced. Therefore, consumers
who purchase drug x for use f pay the regulated price, ¯ p2, and the producer of












, then failing to include use f in the bargaining process is of
no consequence for it is regulated and the regulator’s payoﬀ from use f is the same
as if it was included in the bargaining process. However, if ν∗ < (>)ν∗f, then the
regulator’s payoﬀ is less than (greater than) what it would be if use f was included
in the bargaining process. This is not leakage, but there is a problem of unnegotiated
transfers which may or may not reduce the regulator’s payoﬀ.
5. Two Regulated Prices
The analysis to date has been based on there being one regulated price. However,
the Australian government sets two regulated prices, one signiﬁcantly lower than the
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other. Consumers with a certain characteristic, eg a welfare recipient, are regarded
as concessional patients and can purchase at the low price, other consumers are
regarded as general patients and purchase at the high price. Resale is stopped by
having consumers who are eligible for the low price present documentation to this
eﬀect.
The analysis is now amended to allow for two regulated prices. This is achieved
by dividing the single market for a class of drugs into two separate markets. The
consumers with θ ≤ θ < θc can purchase at the lower regulated price, p
1 = p
2, and
consumers with θc ≤ θ < ¯ θ purchase at the higher regulated price. ¯ p1 = ¯ p2.12 The
number of cases to consider is large because in addition to the two regulated prices
being exogenously given to the regulator, the θ at which the market is separated, θc,
is also exogenously given to the regulator. Therefore, only the two most interesting
cases are considered.
Case 5: c < p
2 < ¯ p2 ≤ α < pn
2
In this case, the higher regulated price is below α so in the absence of the lower
regulated price only the high quality ﬁrm is regulated, the market is covered, and all
consumers purchase the high quality drug. The addition of the lower price, p
2, for
consumers with θ < θc, does not alter the equilibrium payoﬀs of either the regulator
or the ﬁrm from those that occur with only the one price, ¯ p2. This follows because
the additional surplus (ˆ S1 = 0 + ˆ S2 + ˆ Π2 − Sn
1 − Sn
2 − Πn
2) generated by regulation
is the same whether there is one regulated price or two, so from (21) and (22) the
payoﬀs are the same with one regulated price or two. However, the transfer is not
the same as ˆ S2 increases and ˆ Π2 decreases with the addition of the lower regulated
price. Therefore, from (19) the transfer, ˆ L∗, increases. As a result, the per-unit
subsidy and agreed price also increase with the addition of the lower regulated price.
The intuition is clear. The addition of the lower regulated price has no eﬀect on
the number of consumers buying the high quality drug because all consumers are
12Tirole 1988 provides an interpretation of θ as the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution
between income and quality. Wealthier consumers have a lower “marginal utility of income” or,
equivalently, a higher θ. With this interpretation, wealthier consumers pay the high price.
2227
THE DRUG BARGAINING GAME: PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION IN AUSTRALIA
buying the high quality drug in the absence of the lower regulated price. Therefore,
the lower regulated price increases the consumer surplus of those purchasing at the
lower price at the cost of reduced proﬁt for the high quality ﬁrm.
Case 6: c < p
2 ≤ α < ¯ p2 < pn
2
In this case, the higher regulated price is above α so in the absence of the lower
regulated price either (i) only the high quality drug is regulated and some consumers
purchase the low quality drug (those with a relatively low θ), or (ii) both high and
low quality drugs are regulated and some consumer might not purchase either drug
First, consider (i). The addition of the lower regulated price ensures all con-
sumers with θ ≤ θc purchase the high quality drug. If θc is greater than or equal to
the θ of the consumer who is indiﬀerent between purchasing the high or low quality
drug with just the higher regulated price, then the market is covered and all con-
sumers purchase the high quality drug. If not, then some consumers would continue
to purchase the low quality drug. For the market consisting of those consumers with
θ ≤ θc, the regulated price is below α. It was shown above, in Case 2b, that for a
market in which this is true, regulating just the high quality ﬁrm dominates other
regulatory regimes. Therefore, the addition of the lower regulated price increases
the payoﬀ of the regulator. Once again, the intuition is clear. The addition of the
lower regulated price ensures that some consumers, who in its absence, purchased
the low quality drug now purchase the high quality drug. This increases the addi-
tional surplus generated by regulation and so increases both the regulator’s and the
regulated ﬁrm’s payoﬀs.
Secondly, consider (ii). Both ﬁrms are regulated to stop the low quality ﬁrm
stealing consumers, with a low θ, from the high quality ﬁrm. As the lower regulated
price is below α, all those consumers with θ ≤ θc purchase the high quality drug.
Assuming that θc is such that the market is covered and all consumers purchase the
high quality drug, having two regulated prices dispenses with the need to regulate
both ﬁrms. This leaves ¯ S2 + ¯ Π2 unchanged, if the market was covered with just
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the higher regulated price, but increases it to ˆ S2 + ˆ Π2, if the market was uncovered
with just the higher regulated price. With two regulated prices, there is no need to
include the low quality ﬁrm in the bargaining process (no consumers are stolen by
the low quality ﬁrm), so the regulator’s payoﬀ is greater with two regulated prices
and just the high quality ﬁrm being regulated, than with one regulated price and
both ﬁrms being regulated. It should be noted that the high quality ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is
also greater with two regulated prices than one.
An implication of Cases 5 and 6 is that having two regulated prices only increases
the regulator’s payoﬀ if the higher regulated price is above α. Two regulated prices
would not be needed if one regulated price was in place and set below α. In fact, this
follows directly from Proposition 3. The arbitrariness of the regulated price and the
fact that it is the same for all drug classes is what introduces the possibility that
two regulated prices might lead to a greater payoﬀ for the regulator. Once again,
equity of access seems to be the main driving force behind the setting of regulated
prices rather than eﬃciency.
Equity of access and eﬃciency can both be achieved if regulated prices are set
below the α of the relevant drug class. However, this may involve large transfers
being paid to the regulated ﬁrm/s. Although these transfers have been accounted for
in the regulator’s payoﬀ, the revenue that has to raised to implement these transfers
may have political or deadweight loss costs that need to be taken into account. For
a particular drug class, having one price below α and another price above α (that
still leaves the market covered), reduces the size of the transfer and so can make
regulation with two prices more attractive to the regulator than regulation with one
price.
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5.1. The Safety Net
To ensure equity of access, the PBS system includes general patient and conces-
sional patient safety net thresholds.13 When a general patient’s and/or their fam-
ily’s expenditure on drugs in a calendar year reaches the threshold, they become
concessional patients and pay the concessional regulated price. When a concessional
patient’s and/or their family’s expenditure on drugs in a calendar year reaches the
threshold they receive drugs free of charge.
Incorporating the safety net into the analysis is straighforward. For Cases 5 and
6 an additional regulated price of zero increases ˆ S2 and decreases ˆ Π2 by an equal
amount. Therefore, ˆ S2 + ˆ Π2 is unchanged as are the regulator’s and ﬁrm’s payoﬀs.
ˆ L∗ increases so the zero price leads to a pure transfer from the regulator to those who
consume at the zero price. For the case where 0 < α < p
2 < ¯ p2, the introduction
of a zero price for some consumers is qualitatively identical to Case 6 above and so
increases the regulator’s and the high quality ﬁrm’s payoﬀs..
6. Exogenous Innovation and Regulation
To date it has been implicitly assumed that the stage game outlined in section 3 is
repeated every period. If nothing in the environment changes, then the equilibrium
of the game does not change either. In this section, it is assumed that a new drug
exogenously becomes available. This changes the environment of the stage game
and so can change which drug is regulated and the size of any transfer.
6.1. A New Low Quality (Generic) Drug
Assume ﬁrm 0 can produce a new drug of low quality, where s0 ≤ s1. This ﬁrm will
be called the generic ﬁrm and the drug it produces the generic drug.14 The question
to address is how the presence of this ﬁrm eﬀects the equilibrium of the PBS stage
13Currently the general patient threshold is A$686-40 and the concessional patient threshold is
A$187-20.
14The physical properties of the generic drug may be identical to those of the low quality drug,
but might be perceived by consumers as of lower quality.
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The case of most interest is where it is proﬁtable for the generic ﬁrm to produce.
This requires that θ ≤ s2−s1
3(s2−s0) and is assumed.15 The best response functions are
P0 =
P1 + c − (s1 − s0)θ
2
; P2 =








P2(s1 − s0) + P0(s2 − s1)
2(s2 − s0)
. (35)
The expressions for the Nash equilibrium prices are messy and are not given, how-
ever, they are denoted, Pn
0 , Pn
1 , and Pn
2 . Not surprisingly, it can be shown that
the introduction of the generic drug reduces the equilibrium prices of drugs 1 and 2






The intuition is clear. The generic competes directly with the low quality ﬁrm, so in
equilibrium the low quality ﬁrm’s price is lower than in the absence of the generic.
As the low quality ﬁrm’s price is lower and prices are strategic complements, the
equilibrium price of the high quality ﬁrm is also lower than in the absence of the
generic.
High Quality Firm Regulated - Other Firms Unregulated
Let φ0 = c + 2θ(s2 − s0), and the regulated price be ¯ P2. Note that φ0 > α. At
¯ P2 = φ0, calculation reveals that in equilibrium P1( ¯ P2) = c + (s1 − s0)θ = α0 and
P0( ¯ P2) = c. The equilibrium price of ﬁrm 1 is such that the generic ﬁrm prices at
15If this condition is satisﬁed, then the unregulated Nash equilibrium price of the generic ﬁrm is
at least as large as marginal cost.
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marginal cost and makes no sales. Note the similarity of α0 to α. The following
apply, (i) if ¯ P2 > φ0, then all three ﬁrms can proﬁtably produce; (ii) if φ0 ≥ ¯ P2 > α,
then ﬁrms 1 and 2 can proﬁtably produce; and ﬁnally, (iii) if ¯ P2 ≤ α, then only ﬁrm
2 can proﬁtably produce.
6.1.2. The Other Stages
To keep the eﬀects of the introduction of a generic drug as transparent as possible
only the more interesting cases are considered and the analysis is made less formal.
Case 7: c < ¯ P2 ≤ φ0 < Pn
2
Although it is proﬁtable for the generic ﬁrm to produce in the absence of regu-
lation, in the presence of regulation, it is not. The analysis of the various stages of
the game is identical to that in the previous sections except that the disagreement
payoﬀs of ﬁrms 1 and 2 are lower. Therefore, the negotiated transfer/s to ﬁrm 2, if
only the high quality ﬁrm is regulated, or ﬁrms 1 and 2, if both ﬁrms are regulated,
is/are smaller and the regulator’s payoﬀ is larger than in the absence of the generic
ﬁrm.
The mere presence of the generic ﬁrm has increased the payoﬀ of the regulator
even though the generic ﬁrm makes no sales. However, to realise this larger payoﬀ
requires the regulator to renegotiate the size of the transfer and the implied agreed
price that is paid to the regulated ﬁrm/s. Failure to do so results in a failure to
extract all the beneﬁts that the presence of a generic drug can bring.
Case 8: c < Pn
2 < ¯ p2 = ¯ P2 = ¯ P1 = ¯ P0 < pn
2.
In this case, the regulated price is below the unregulated price of the high quality
ﬁrm in the absence of the generic ﬁrm, but above the unregulated price of the high
quality ﬁrm in the presence of the generic ﬁrm. In the absence of the generic ﬁrm,
it was shown in the preceding sections, that either the high quality ﬁrm is regulated
or both the high and low quality ﬁrms are regulated. However, in the presence of
the generic ﬁrm, the regulator chooses not to regulate any ﬁrm in stage three. In
this case, any regulated drug should be removed from the PBS list and have its
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per-unit subsidy removed. The extra competition generated by the generic ﬁrm
results in equilibrium prices that are below the regulated level and so no regulation
is necessary.
Failure to remove any regulated drug from the PBS list commits regulated ﬁrms
to prices greater than the unregulated prices and so induces higher equilibrium prices
from the unregulated ﬁrm/s.16 This reduces the regulator’s payoﬀ below the case
where regulated drugs are removed from the PBS lists, because (i) consumer surplus
is lower and (ii) the per-unit subsidy results in the high quality ﬁrm receiving a
transfer.
6.2. A New Higher Quality Drug
Assume ﬁrm 3 can produce a new drug of extra high quality s3 ≥ s2. This ﬁrm will
be called the best ﬁrm and the drug it produces the best drug.
6.2.1. Stage Five
With an appropriate relabelling, the analysis is identical to that in the previous
subsection. Firm 0 is now ﬁrm 1, ﬁrm 1 is now ﬁrm 2, and ﬁrm 2 is now ﬁrm 3. Let
φ3 = c + 2θ(s3 − s1) and α3 = c + (s3 − s2)θ.
6.2.2. The Other Stages
Once again only a few cases are considered.
Case 7a: c < ¯ P3 = ¯ P2 = ¯ P1 = ¯ p2 < α and α3 < φ3 < Pn
3 < pn
2
In the absence of ﬁrm 3, ﬁrm 2 is regulated and ﬁrm 1 is not. In the presence
of ﬁrm 3, this case is similar in structure to Case 7 above and the regulator chooses
to regulate the best ﬁrm, ﬁrm 3. Firms 1 and 2 price equal to marginal cost and
make no sales. The regulator’s payoﬀ has increased with the addition of the best
ﬁrm because it produces the highest quality drug and yields the largest additional
surplus from a regulation agreement. For small k, ﬁrm 3 enters the evaluation stage
16The failure to remove regulation in the presence of generic drugs provides another explanation
for the ﬁnding of Danzon and Chao (2000b) that there is little price competition between generic
drug producers in regulated markets.
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as the bargaining process ensures it obtains a payoﬀ larger than its disagreement
payoﬀ. In this case, it does not matter whether ﬁrm 2 is removed from the regulation
list or not because under either scenario its makes no sales and receives no transfer.17
Case 8a: c < Pn
3 < ¯ p2 = ¯ P3 = ¯ P2 = ¯ P1 < α < φ3 < pn
2
In the absence of ﬁrm 3, ﬁrm 2 is regulated and ﬁrm 1 is not. However, in the
presence of ﬁrm 3, s3 is such that Pn
3 is less than the regulated price.18 Therefore, in
the presence of ﬁrm 3, the regulator chooses not to regulate any ﬁrm. Competition
between ﬁrms 2 and 3 is so ﬁerce that it is better to not regulate than regulate at
the given regulation price. This case is identical in structure to Case 8 above and
failure to remove ﬁrm 2 from the PBS list reduces the regulator’s payoﬀ.
7. Conclusion
Although the model of pharmaceutical regulation developed in this paper is relatively
simple and based on the Australian Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Scheme, it is a very rich
model with many implications for pharmaceutical regulation that extend beyond the
Australian setting. The ﬁrst is that although the regulated price is chosen to ensure
equity of access, it also has eﬃciency implications that should be considered when
its level is set. These eﬃciency consideration suggest the policy of having a single
identical price for all drug classes needs to be re-examined. If the regulated price
is the same for all drug classes, then having a diﬀerent regulated price for diﬀerent
groups of consumers using a drug of a particular class, can increase the regulator’s
payoﬀ. However, it should be noted that using two regulated prices within a drug
class would not be needed if the regulated price diﬀered between drug classes and
was chosen with eﬃciency and equity in mind.
Secondly, although the negotiated agreed price is below the unregulated price of
the high quality drug, high quality pharmaceutical ﬁrms that are regulated achieve
17Firm 2 receives no transfer if the transfer is made via a per-unit subsidy, but if it is made as
a lump-sum ﬁrm 2 would have to be removed from the regulation list and its transfer reduced to
zero.
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greater payoﬀs than they do in the absence of regulation. In this light, the hostility
of the pharmaceutical industry to regulation and the claim that it reduces proﬁt can
be viewed as an attempt to extract more of the total additional surplus, generated
by regulation, in the bargaining process.19
Thirdly, leakage does not necessarily reduce the regulator’s payoﬀ, because al-
though it increases transfers above what are negotiated it also increases consumer
surplus. Unnegotiated transfers arise because restrictions on subsidised use are not
enforced. Methods to avoid unnegotiated transfers include, enforcement of restric-
tions, use of price-volume contracts, or the use of lump-sum transfers rather than
per-unit transfers. Finally, the introduction of new drugs, of low or high quality,
necessitates the renegotiation of existing regulatory arrangements including the re-
moval of drugs from regulation if all the beneﬁts from new drugs are to be realised.
In this paper, pharmaceutical regulation was modelled from the perspective of a
small country so that regulatory decisions did not eﬀect R&D. Future research will
be aimed at extending the framework of this paper to the case of a large country,
where ﬁrm payoﬀs have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on R&D expenditure.
19The same argument applies to the view that pharmaceutical regulation, along the lines of the
Australian PBS, inhibits R&D by reducing ﬁrm payoﬀs.
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9. Appendix
Proof that ˆ S1 + ˆ S2, ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 + ˆ Π2, and ˇ S1 + ˇ S2 + ˇ Π1 are decreasing functions
of ¯ p2 = ¯ p1.
ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 =
 ˜ θ(p1,p2)
θ
(θs1 − p1(p2))dθ +
 ¯ θ
˜ θ(p1,p2)
(θs2 − p2(p1))dθ (37)
Diﬀerentiating (37) with respect to p2 and using the fact that ˜ θs1 − p1 = ˜ θs2 − p2
at ˜ θ yields
∂(ˆ S1 + ˆ S2)
∂p2
= ˜ θ(·) − ¯ θ +
∂p1
∂p2
(θ − ˜ θ(·)) < 0 (38)
because prices are strategic complements and θ ≤ ˜ θ ≤ ¯ θ.
ˆ Π2 = (p2(p1) − c)(¯ θ − ˜ θ(p1,p2)) (39)
Diﬀerentiating (39) with respect to p2 yields
∂ˆ Π2
∂p2




Combining (38) and (40) yields










∂p2 ≥ 0. For p2 ≤ α, θ = ˜ θ and (41) equals zero while for p2 > α (41) is
strictly less than zero.
The proof that ˇ S1 + ˇ S2 + ˇ Π1 is a decreasing function of ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 is identical to
that above after relabelling.
The Bargaining Problem where Both Firms are Regulated
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L1 ≥ 0; L2 ≥ 0 (43)
Assuming an interior solution, solving the ﬁrst order conditions, and substituting
into the regulator’s payoﬀ yields
¯ S1 + ¯ S2 − ¯ L∗
1 − ¯ L∗
2 =









The regulator’s payoﬀ is the payoﬀ it gets in the absence of an agreement plus one
third of the additional surplus generated by the agreement. The same logic applies
to the payoﬀs of the two ﬁrms.
Proof of (26) in the Text.
Where both ﬁrms are regulated at ¯ p1 = ¯ p2 = pn
2, those consumers who purchased
the low quality drug in the absence of regulation, consume the high quality drug or
no drug under regulation. As these consumer could have done this in the absence of
regulation, but chose not to, it follows that
¯ S1(= 0) + ¯ S2 < Sn
1 + Sn
2 at ¯ p1 = ¯ p2 = pn
2. (45)
A similar argument establishes that
¯ S2 < ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 ∀ ¯ p1 = ¯ p2 > pn
2 (46)
which combined with (8) of the text yields
¯ S2 < Sn
1 + Sn
2 ∀ ¯ p1 = ¯ p2 ≥ pn
2. (47)
Therefore,
¯ S1(= 0) + ¯ S2 − L∗ < Sn
1 + Sn
2 ∀ L∗ ≥ 0. (48)
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Proof of Proposition 3: It suﬃces to show that any regulated price in the interval
α < ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 ≤ pn
1 has a smaller payoﬀ than any price in the interval c ≤ ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 ≤ α,
and that all prices in the latter interval have the same payoﬀ.
For a regulated price in the interval c ≤ ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 ≤ α, the high quality ﬁrm
enters, is regulated, and receives payoﬀ
ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 − ˆ L∗ =













Now ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 + ˆ Π2 is independent of ¯ p2 over this interval, therefore, all regulated
prices in this interval have the same payoﬀ. It was shown above that ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 + ˆ Π2
is a decreasing function of ¯ p2 over the interval α ≤ ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 ≤ pn
1. Therefore,
ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 + ˆ Π2 reaches a maximum at ¯ p2 = α, and any regulated price in the interval
α < ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 ≤ pn
1 has a smaller payoﬀ than any price in the interval c ≤ ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 ≤ α,
for the case where the high quality ﬁrm is regulated.
What about where both ﬁrms are regulated? The regulator’s payoﬀ is
¯ S2 + ¯ S1 − ¯ L1 − ¯ L2 =










At ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 = α, (50) is less than (49), because of the inclusion of Πn
1 and the division
by 3. Now (50) is independent of ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 over the interval [α,1] and decreasing over
the interval [1,pn
2]. Therefore, ¯ S2+ ¯ S1− ¯ L1− ¯ L2 reaches a maximum at ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 = α,
and any regulated price in the interval α < ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 ≤ pn
1 has a smaller payoﬀ, for the
case where both ﬁrms are regulated, than any price in the interval c ≤ ¯ p2 = ¯ p1 ≤ α,




Consider the case where ¯ p2 ≤ α, that is, only the high quality ﬁrm is regulated
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and it covers the market. Suppose pa
2 ≥ pn
2.
ˆ S2 − Sn










































2 − ¯ p2) (51)
The last inequality follows because, in the absence of regulation, consumers in the
interval [θ, ˜ θ] purchase the low quality drug. Rearranging (51) yields
ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 − (pa




2 − ¯ p2 is the implied transfer under the agreed price and its size contradicts
(27) of the text. Therefore, the supposition is incorrect. A similar proof can be
constructed for the case where ¯ p2 > α.
Table 1
c=.25, θ = .5, ¯ θ = 1.5, s1 = 1, s2 = 2.
¯ p2, ¯ p1 Sn
1 + Sn
2 ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 ˆ L∗ ˆ S1 + ˆ S2 − ˆ L∗ ˇ S1 + ˇ S2 ˇ L∗ ˇ S1 + ˇ S2 − ˇ L∗ ¯ S2 ¯ L1 ¯ L2 ¯ S2 − ¯ L1 − ¯ L2
1.2 .9306 .8253 .525 .81u .81
pn
2 = 1.087 .9306 .9306 .5833 .9184u .9184
1 .9306 1.0078 .0577 .9501 .625 1 .0486 0 .9514
.85 .9306 1.1512 .1726 .9787 .7 1.15 .0602 .1269 .963
α = .75 .9306 1.25 .2569 .9931 .75 1.25 .0602 .2269 .963
.6 .9306 1.4 .4069 .9931 .8278 1.4 .0602 .3769 .963
pn
1 = .41 .9306 1.5833 .5903 .9931 .9306 0 .9306 1.6684 .0602 .5602 .963
.3 .9306 1.7 .7069 .9931 1.0003 .0431 .9571 1.8225 .0602 .6769 .963
A “u” superscript denotes a situation where the market is uncovered.
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